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Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem

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Author Info
Bykowsky, Mark M
Cull, Robert J
Ledyard, John O

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Abstract

In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a "simple" (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in "fitting complexity." In some environments, bidding may become "mutually destructive." Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a "threshold" problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 205-28
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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:205-28

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Charles R. Plott, 1997. "Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 605-638, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jeffrey S. Banks & John O. Ledyard & David P. Porter, 1989. "Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 1-25, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Tjalling C. Koopmans & Martin J. Beckmann, 1955. "Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 4, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Mamer, John W., 1997. "Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 385-413, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. John O. Ledyard, 1994. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Public Economics 9405003, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1994. [Downloadable!]
  7. Olson, Mark & Porter, David, 1994. "An Experimental Examination into the Design of Decentralized Methods to Solve the Assignment Problem with and without Money," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 11-40, January.
  8. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Ostroy, Joseph M., 2002. "The Package Assignment Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 377-406, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Plott, Charles R, 1986. "Rational Choice in Experimental Markets," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S301-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Sander Onderstal & Rupert Sausgruber, 2006. "The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1998. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 97jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Onderstal, S., 2002. "The chopstick auction," Discussion Paper 35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tomomi Tanaka, 2007. "Resource Allocation with Spatial Externalities: Experiments on Land Consolidation," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1622-1622. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Lawrence White, 2000. ""Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin," Working Papers 00-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001. [Downloadable!]
  8. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2006. "Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions," Staff General Research Papers 12698, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Damme, E. van, 1999. "The Dutch DCS-1800 auction," Discussion Paper 77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  10. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Papers of Peter Cramton 97jemsfcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Katerina Sherstyuk, 2002. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Common Complementarities," Working Papers 200212, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Peter Cramton, 1998. "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98jlefcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 27 Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey," Discussion Papers 1296, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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