This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Bykowsky, Mark M
Cull, Robert J
Ledyard, John O
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a "simple" (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in "fitting complexity." In some environments, bidding may become "mutually destructive." Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a "threshold" problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics .
Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 205-28
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:205-28Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Charles R. Plott, 1997.
"Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 605-638, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982.
"A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jeffrey S. Banks & John O. Ledyard & David P. Porter, 1989.
"Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tjalling C. Koopmans & Martin J. Beckmann, 1955.
"Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
4, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Bikhchandani, Sushil & Mamer, John W., 1997.
"Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 385-413, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
John O. Ledyard, 1994.
"Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research ,"
Public Economics
9405003, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1994.
[Downloadable!]
John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996.
"The allocation of a shared resource within an organization ,"
Review of Economic Design ,
Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 163-192, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Ledyard, John O. & Noussair, Charles & Porter, David, .
"The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization ,"
Working Papers
917, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!] Ledyard, J.O. & Noussair, C. & Porter, D., 1994.
"The Allocation of Shared Resource within an Organization ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1063, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Olson, Mark & Porter, David, 1994.
"An Experimental Examination into the Design of Decentralized Methods to Solve the Assignment Problem with and without Money ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 11-40, January.
Bikhchandani, Sushil & Ostroy, Joseph M., 2002.
"The Package Assignment Model ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 377-406, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Plott, Charles R, 1986.
"Rational Choice in Experimental Markets ,"
Journal of Business ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S301-27, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000.
"Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Onderstal, S., 2002.
"The chopstick auction ,"
Discussion Paper
35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Lawrence White, 2000.
""Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin ,"
Working Papers
00-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Tomomi Tanaka, 2005.
"Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation ,"
Experimental
0511004, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Peter Cramton, 2002.
"Spectrum Auctions ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
[Downloadable!]
Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2006.
"Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions ,"
Staff General Research Papers
12698, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Heide Coenen & Manfred J. Holler & Esko Niskanen, 2000.
"5th Helsinki Workshop on Standardization and Networks, 13-14 August, 2000 ,"
Discussion Papers
243, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
[Downloadable!]
Damme, E. van, 1999.
"The Dutch DCS-1800 auction ,"
Discussion Paper
77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Peter Cramton, 1998.
"The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
98jlefcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 27 Jul 1998.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Anders Lunander & Jan-Eric Nilsson, 2004.
"Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts ,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics ,
Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-58, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Sander Onderstal & Rupert Sausgruber, 2006.
"The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Sander Onderstal & Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Rupert Sausgruber, 2004.
"The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions ,"
Working Papers
2004.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!] Englmaier, Florian & Guillén, Pablo & Llorente, Loreto & Onderstal, Sander & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2009.
"The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 286-291, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1998.
"Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
97jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Peter Cramton, 1997.
"The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
97jemsfcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Jul 1998.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Katerina Sherstyuk, 2002.
"Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Common Complementarities ,"
Working Papers
200212, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996.
"The allocation of a shared resource within an organization ,"
Review of Economic Design ,
Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 163-192, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Ledyard, John O. & Noussair, Charles & Porter, David, .
"The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization ,"
Working Papers
917, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!] Ledyard, J.O. & Noussair, C. & Porter, D., 1994.
"The Allocation of Shared Resource within an Organization ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1063, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Chow, YuenLeng & Yavas, Abdullah, 2008.
"Auctions with Positive Synergies: Experimental Evidence ,"
MPRA Paper
12669, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Katerina Sherstyuk, 2009.
"A comparison of first price multi-object auctions ,"
Experimental Economics ,
Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 42-64, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000.
"Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey ,"
Discussion Papers
1296, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? RePEc encourages publishers to make their bibliographic data freely available to the public.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .