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Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem

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  • Bykowsky, Mark M
  • Cull, Robert J
  • Ledyard, John O

Abstract

In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a "simple" (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in "fitting complexity." In some environments, bidding may become "mutually destructive." Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a "threshold" problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 205-28

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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:205-28

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298

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Cited by:
  1. Englmaier, Florian & Guillén, Pablo & Llorente, Loreto & Onderstal, Sander & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2009. "The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 286-291, March.
  2. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1999. "The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction," Discussion Paper 1999-77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Bolle, Friedel, 2008. "Allocation decisions in network industries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 97-112, January.
  4. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2006. "Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions," Staff General Research Papers 12698, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  5. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-52, May.
  6. Song, Jiongjiong & Regan, A C, 2003. "Approximation Algorithms for the Bid Construction Problem in Combinatorial Auctions for the Procurement of Freight Transportation Contracts," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt3j7034z2, University of California Transportation Center.
  7. Chow, YuenLeng & Yavas, Abdullah, 2008. "Auctions with Positive Synergies: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 12669, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Sherstyuk, Katerina, 2003. "On competitive equilibria with common complementarities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-62, August.
  9. Anders Lunander & Jan-Eric Nilsson, 2004. "Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-58, January.
  10. Song, Jiongjiong & Regan, Amelia, 2005. "Approximation algorithms for the bid construction problem in combinatorial auctions for the procurement of freight transportation contracts," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 39(10), pages 914-933, December.
  11. Katerina Sherstyuk, 2009. "A comparison of first price multi-object auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 42-64, March.
  12. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multi-Unit Auctions," Working Papers 201301, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  13. Heide Coenen & Manfred J. Holler & Esko Niskanen, 2000. "5th Helsinki Workshop on Standardization and Networks, 13-14 August, 2000," Discussion Papers 243, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
  14. Tomomi Tanaka, 2005. "Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation," Experimental 0511004, EconWPA.
  15. Chernomaz, Kirill & Levin, Dan, 2012. "Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 611-635.
  16. Katerina Sherstyuk, 2002. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Common Complementarities," Working Papers 200212, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  17. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
  18. Onderstal, A.M., 2002. "The Chopstick Auction," Discussion Paper 2002-35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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