Subjective Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector: Evidence from School Inspections
AbstractPerformance measurement in the public sector is largely based on objective metrics, which may be subject to gaming behaviour. This paper investigates a novel subjective performance evaluation system where independent inspectors visit schools at very short notice, publicly disclose their findings and sanction schools rated fail. First, I demonstrate that inspection ratings can aid in distinguishing between more and less effective schools, even after controlling for standard observed school characteristics. Second, exploiting a natural experiment, I show that a fail inspection leads to test score gains; at least some of these gains persist in the medium term. I find no evidence to suggest that fail schools are able to inflate test score performance by gaming the system. Oversight by inspectors may play an important role in mitigating such strategic behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE in its series CEE Discussion Papers with number 0135.
Date of creation: Feb 2012
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Web page: http://cee.lse.ac.uk/publications.htm
subjective performance evaluation; gaming behavior; school inspections.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2012-03-08 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-URE-2012-03-08 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kenneth Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2003.
"The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions that Use Test Scores to Rank Schools,"
0304-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2005. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions That Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1237-1258, September.
- Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2003. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions that Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," NBER Working Papers 10118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marco Bertoni & Giorgio Brunello & Lorenzo Rocco, 2013.
"When the Cat is Near, the Mice Won't Play: The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp1191, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Bertoni, Marco & Brunello, Giorgio & Rocco, Lorenzo, 2013. "When the cat is near, the mice won't play: The effect of external examiners in Italian schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 65-77.
- Bertoni, Marco & Brunello, Giorgio & Rocco, Lorenzo, 2012. "When the Cat Is Near, the Mice Won't Play: The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools," IZA Discussion Papers 6629, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Marco Bertoni & Giorgio Brunello & Lorenzo Rocco, 2012. "When the Cat is Near, the Mice Wonft Play: The Effect of External Examiners in Italian Schools," ISER Discussion Paper 0845, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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