In this paper we obtain empirical evidence of the relationship between individuals' risk attitudes and individuals' beliefs on their rival's choices in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We find that (i) Risk-averse subjects seem to think that their opponent will defect, (ii) Risk-loving individuals tend to think that their opponent will cooperate with higher probabilities, and (iii) finally, those subjects who believe that the rival will behave rationally are more risk averse than those subjects that believe that the rival will make a mistake, who on average are risk neutral.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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