This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

An Economic Theory of Emission Cap Determination by an International Agreement

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sudhir A. Shah (Delhi School of Economics)
Abstract

We attempt to clarify the problem of determination of national emission endowments under the Kyoto protocol. We argue that many issues, such as assigning culpability and compensation for the current global stock of carbon and the linking of emission endowments to per capita entitlements, are better handled through direct lump-sum transfers and not via distortions of the endowments of emission flows. Given these arguments, we model the distribution of endowments as equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. This framework allows us to make qualitative predictions about the impact of international differences on the pattern of emission caps. We also perform simple comparative statistic exercises that predict how the equilibrium caps vary with parametric changes. Moreover, we study how nations can manipulate the emission caps by strategic investment in technology and damage control.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cdedse.org/papers/20febfloppy/work88.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its series Working papers with number 88.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:88

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Delhi 110 007
Phone: (011) 27667005
Fax: (011) 27667159
Email:
Web page: http://www.cdedse.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.cdedse.org/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Vinayan. K.P).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Stavins, Robert & Hahn, Robert, 1999. "What Has Kyoto Wrought? The Real Architecture of International Tradable Permit Markets," Discussion Papers dp-99-30, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 150000 papers.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-10.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.