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A Ramsey Bound on Jordan Stable Sets

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Author Info
Manfred Kerber
Colin Rowat

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Abstract

Jordan [2006] defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator represents a ‘power function’ constrained by monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We bound their cardinality above by a Ramsey number and show this bound to be tight for two agents. More generally, it is not tight as it does not make use of structural information across partial orders on the stable set.

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File URL: ftp://ftp.bham.ac.uk/pub/RePEc/pdf/09-01.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 09-01.

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Length: 4 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:09-01

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Postal: Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT
Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
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Related research
Keywords: Pillage; cooperative game theory; stable sets;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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