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Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games

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Author Info

  • Sonja Brangewitz

    ()
    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Jan-Philip Gamp

    ()
    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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    Abstract

    We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors of certain markets linked to that game. This can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases of Shapley and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be extended to any closed convex subset of the core, but they omit the details of the proof which we present here. This more general case is in particular interesting, as the two theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975) are included as special cases.

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    File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-454.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2011
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 454.

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    Length: 14 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:454

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    Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld
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    Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Market Games; Competitive Payoffs; Core;

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    References

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    1. Sun,N. & Trockel,W. & Yang,Z., 2004. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 358, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
    2. Garratt, Rod & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2000. "On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 165-173, May.
    3. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
    4. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of NTU Market Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 335-44.
    5. Tomoki Inoue, 2010. "Representation of TU games by coalition production economies," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 430, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
    6. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2011. "Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 449, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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    Cited by:
    1. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2011. "Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 453, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

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