A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of NTU Market Games
AbstractIt is shown that for every NTU market game, there is a market that represents the game whose competitive payoff vectors completely fill up the inner core of the game. It is also shown that for every NTU market game and for any point in its inner core, there is a market that represents the game and further has the given inner core point as its unique competitive payoff vector. The results prove a conjecture of Shapley and Shubik.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 22 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders, 2006.
"Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games,"
Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
0614, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Page Jr., Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna, 2009. "Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 462-487, May.
- Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2007. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Caepr Working Papers 2007-020, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Inoue, Tomoki, 2013. "Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 141-149.
- Sun,N. & Trockel,W. & Yang,Z., 2004.
"Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game,"
358, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
- Sun, N. & Trockel, W. & Yang, Z.F., 2004. "Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game," Discussion Paper 2004-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2011. "Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games," Working Papers 454, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 2006.
"The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 180-197, April.
- Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Shapley, Lloyd S & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 2004. "The Walras Core of an Economy and Its Limit Theorem," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6hp534w3, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Tomoki Inoue, 2010. "Representation of TU games by coalition production economies," Working Papers 430, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.