Tomoki Inoue () (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
Abstract
We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many indivisible commodities that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy with a sufficiently large number of agents, but finitely many agents, the strong core coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations. Because of the indivisibility, the preference maximization does not imply the cost minimization. A cost-minimized Walras equilibrium is a state where, under some price vector, all agents satisfy both the preference maximization and the cost minimization.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number
417.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
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