On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles
AbstractWe consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 390.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2012. "On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 588-600.
- Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2009. "On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 803.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul Milgrom, 2008.
"Assignment Messages and Exchanges,"
08-014, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2002.
"Core Many-To-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods,"
1140, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2008. "On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 497-518, March.
- Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
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