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Announcements are not Enough: Foreign Exchange Intervention under Imperfect Credibility

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Abstract

Central banks in emerging countries frequently build-up (diminish) reserves while attempting to depreciate (appreciate) their domestic currencies. Even if these interventions are effective, they often entail various costs. Basu (2012), nonetheless, proposes a model in which the sole announcement of an intervention schedule leads to a desired exchange rate without actually buying or selling foreign currency. In this paper we present a generalization that allows for imperfect credibility of foreign exchange intervention. Namely, market dealers know that the central bank carries strategic incentives when announcing its schedule and may not perfectly believe it. We show that, under this setup, it may be impossible for central banks to achieve the desired exchange rate level without changing their position of international reserves.

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  • Jose E. Gomez-Gonzalez & Julian A. Parra-Polania & Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas, 2016. "Announcements are not Enough: Foreign Exchange Intervention under Imperfect Credibility," Borradores de Economia 949, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:949
    DOI: 10.32468/be.949
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    1. Jérôme Héricourt & Sandra Poncet, 2015. "Exchange Rate Volatility, Financial Constraints, and Trade: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Firms," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 29(3), pages 550-578.
    2. Dennis, Richard, 2014. "Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 218-234.
    3. Devereux, Michael B., 2004. "Should the exchange rate be a shock absorber?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 359-377, March.
    4. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Fear of Floating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(2), pages 379-408.
    5. Adler, Gustavo & Mano, Rui C., 2021. "The Cost of Foreign Exchange Intervention: Concepts and Measurement," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    6. Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo & Sturzenegger, Federico & Gluzmann, Pablo Alfredo, 2013. "Fear of appreciation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 233-247.
    7. Bodenstein, Martin & Hebden, James & Nunes, Ricardo, 2012. "Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 135-149.
    8. Garcia, Carlos J. & Restrepo, Jorge E. & Roger, Scott, 2011. "How much should inflation targeters care about the exchange rate?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1590-1617.
    9. Cubillos-Rocha, Juan S. & Gomez-Gonzalez, Jose E. & Melo-Velandia, Luis F., 2019. "Detecting exchange rate contagion using copula functions," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 13-22.
    10. Charles Engel, 2011. "Currency Misalignments and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Reexamination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2796-2822, October.
    11. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
    12. Gomez-Gonzalez, Jose E. & Rojas-Espinosa, Wilmer, 2019. "Detecting contagion in Asian exchange rate markets using asymmetric DCC-GARCH and R-vine copulas," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 43(3).
    13. Basu, Kaushik, 2012. "How to devalue exchange rates, without building up reserves: Strategic theory for central banking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 758-761.
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    Cited by:

    1. Julian A. Parra-Polania & Andrés Sánchez-Jabba & Miguel Sarmiento, 2022. "Oral FX Interventions in Emerging Markets: the Colombian case," Borradores de Economia 1194, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    2. Wenbo Wang & Dieu Thanh Le & Hail Park, 2020. "Is Foreign Exchange Intervention a Panacea in Diversified Circumstances? The Perspectives of Asymmetric Effects," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(7), pages 1-20, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exchange rate; Foreign exchange intervention; Central bank Credibility; Credibility function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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