Staff, Functions, and Staff Costs at Central Banks: An International Comparison with a Labor-demand Model
AbstractDuring the period 2000-2004 central banks sustained a generalized reduction in their staff, which was accompanied, in most cases, with significant increases in staff costs. This could obey to an enhanced interest of central banks in focusing on their core functions. In fact, central banks have changed the ways they perform their operative functions (e.g. currency operations, payment systems operation, printing notes, etc.) through different strategies aimed at gathering the participation of third parties. These strategies differ according to the relationship that central banks have with the financial sector and the government, as well as to their historical tradition and modernization trend. To explain the effect of these changes on the staff, we estimated a short-term labor demand function for 66 central banks using a panel data model with random effects. Results indicate that central banks’ labor demand is strongly determined by the country’s population, economic development level and changes in operative functions, as well as by staff costs. In addition, we found a low employment-wage elasticity suggesting the presence of a flexible budgetary constrain in central banks.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banco de la Republica de Colombia in its series Borradores de Economia with number 419.
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Central Banking; Labor Demand; Modernization; Functions; Staff Costs; Panel Data; Random Effects. Classification JEL: E50; J23; J30; C33;
Other versions of this item:
- Jorge E. Galán Camacho & Miguel Sarmiento Paipilla, 2007. "Staff, Functions, and Staff Costs at Central Banks: an International Comparison with a Labor- Demand Model," Money Affairs, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(2), pages 131-179, July-Dece.
- Jorge Galán Camacho & Miguel Sarmiento, 2006. "Staff, Functions, and Staff Costs at Central Banks: An International Comparison with a Labor-demand Model," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 003524, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
- Ran - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - - - -
- Eff - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - - - -
- Cla - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2006-12-04 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2006-12-04 (Macroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nout Wellink & Bryan Chapple & Philipp Maier, 2002.
"The role of national central banks within the European System of Central Banks: The example of De Nederlandsche Bank,"
- Nout Wellink & Bryan Chapple & Philipp Maier, 2002. "The role of national central banks within the European System of Central Banks: The example of De Nederlandsche Bank," MEB Series (discontinued) 2002-13, Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department.
- James Bohn & Diana Hancock & Paul Bauer, 2001. "Estimates of scale and cost efficiency for Federal Reserve currency operations," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q IV, pages 2-26.
- Hsiao,Cheng, 2003.
"Analysis of Panel Data,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818551, October.
- Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999.
"Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
00-11, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Di Noia, Carmine & Di Giorgio, Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-78, November.
- Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?," Economics Working Papers 411, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999.
"Is bank supervision central to central banking?,"
99-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Jorge Eduardo Galán Camacho & Miguel Sarmiento Paipilla, .
"Banknote Printing At Modern Central Banking: Trends, Costs, And Efficiency,"
Borradores de Economia
476, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
- Jorge Eduardo Galán & Miguel Sarmiento, 2008. "Banknote Printing at Modern central Banking: Trends, Costs and Efficiency," Money Affairs, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(2), pages 217-262, July-Dece.
- Jorge Eduardo Galán Camacho & Miguel Sarmiento Paipilla, 2007. "Banknote Printing At Modern Central Banking:Trends, Costs, And Efficiency," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 004393, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Camilo Millán).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.