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Staying dry on Spanish wine: the rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement (Updated May 2020)

Author

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  • Jacopo Timini

    (Banco de España)

Abstract

After a long debate on wine import tariffs, the Italian Parliament rejected the Spanish-Italian trade agreement on 17 December 1905. This decision left Spain and Italy without a bilateral trade treaty for an entire decade. In the literature, broader political issues and local interests are alternatively indicated as the main drivers of the rejection. Based on a new database which collects economic and political variables (including MPs personal features) and using a probit model, this paper provides a quantitative analysis of the vote. Results show that constituency interests had a role in determining the result of the vote on the trade treaty. Moreover, constituency interests were also important for the “vote switchers”, i.e. those MPs that supported the overall government policy stance in the first round, but opposed the Spanish-Italian trade agreement in the second.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacopo Timini, 2019. "Staying dry on Spanish wine: the rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement (Updated May 2020)," Working Papers 1932, Banco de España, revised May 2020.
  • Handle: RePEc:bde:wpaper:1932
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosTrabajo/19/Fich/dt1932e.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Van Dijck, Maarten & Truyts, Tom, 2011. "Ideas, Interests, and Politics in the Case of Belgian Corn Law Repeal, 1834–1873," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 185-210, March.
    2. Nicholas Weller, 2009. "Trading policy: Constituents and party in U.S. trade policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 87-101, October.
    3. VAN DIJK, Maarten & TRUYTS, Tom, 2011. "Ideas, interests, and politics in the case of Belgian corn law repeal, 1834-1873," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2265, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Nollen, Stanley D & Iglarsh, Harvey J, 1990. "Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade Votes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 137-153, August.
    5. Willmann, Gerald, 2003. "Why Legislators are Protectionists: The Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs," Economics Working Papers 2003-10, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    6. Jacopo Timini, 2018. "The drivers of Italian exports and product market entry: 1862-1913 (Updated August 2020)," Working Papers 1836, Banco de España, revised Aug 2020.
    7. Timini, Jacopo, 2020. "Staying dry on Spanish wine: The rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
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    Cited by:

    1. Erosa, Andrés & González, Beatriz, 2019. "Taxation and the life cycle of firms," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 114-130.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    trade agreement; tariffs; wine; vote;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N73 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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