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Dismantling the south-west coalition: further evidence of distributive politics in preemption legislation

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Listed:
  • William J. Byrd

    (Troy University)

  • John A. Dove

    (Troy University)

Abstract

The factors influencing legislative voting behavior have often been studied. This is especially true regarding antebellum federal preemption legislation. Several conjectures have been posited and evaluated within the literature, with historical analysis suggesting geographic coalitions playing a dominant role. However, more recent empirical research based on a distributive theory of politics casts doubt on this hypothesis (Gailmard and Jenkins Gailmard and Jenkins, Public Choice 175:259–275, 2018). This paper adds to this debate by extending the empirical analysis to include several other potential factors relevant to the decision-making process. These include the ideological disposition of a given legislator, voter preferences, and special interest influences. Our econometric results support the distributive theory model and add additional nuance as well. Specifically, we find that a legislator’s ideological disposition and constituent preferences are a strong indicator of voting behavior, as is geographic location (though not in the manner suggested by historical analysis).

Suggested Citation

  • William J. Byrd & John A. Dove, 2021. "Dismantling the south-west coalition: further evidence of distributive politics in preemption legislation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 193-214, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:22:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s10101-021-00257-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-021-00257-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, 2016. "Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(7), pages 1843-1859, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Preemption; Land Distribution; Land Policy; Federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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