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The regulatory cycle in banking: what lessons from the U.S. experience? (from the Dodd-Frank Act to Covid-19)

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  • Maurizio Trapanese

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

This paper analyses the interactions between financial regulation and crises with reference to the experience of the United States in the period after the global financial crisis up to the Covid-19 emergency. In the last few years, a new regulatory system for large banks has arisen in the U.S., reversing some elements of the Dodd-Frank Act and introducing deviations from the international rules. This approach is also confirmed by some of the measures adopted in response to Covid-19. If this trend were to spread to other jurisdictions, the globally harmonized approach to regulation could break down. In the current exceptional circumstances as well, the international standards must not be breached, as they provide the resilience needed to sustain lending to the economy, and to keep banks safe. With the memory of the global financial crisis fading and the long post-crisis economic expansion coming to an end, the pressures to dilute the G-20 rules could grow stronger. The importance of maintaining a consistent approach to banking regulation needs to be emphasized.

Suggested Citation

  • Maurizio Trapanese, 2020. "The regulatory cycle in banking: what lessons from the U.S. experience? (from the Dodd-Frank Act to Covid-19)," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 585, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_585_20
    as

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    1. Maurizio Trapanese, 2021. "The economics of non-bank financial intermediation: why do we need to fill the regulation gap?," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 625, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial crises; international regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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