Salience, Risky Choices and Gender
AbstractRisk theories typically assume individuals make risky choices using probability weights that differ from objective probabilities. Recent theories suggest that probability weights vary depending on which portion of a risky environment is made salient. Using experimental data we show that salience affects young men and women differently, even after controlling for cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Men are significantly more likely than women to switch from a certain to a risky choice once the upside of winning is made salient, even though the expected value of the choice remains the same.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 659.
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
gender; salience; risk-aversion; probability weights; cognitive ability;
Other versions of this item:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-02-20 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-02-20 (Experimental Economics)
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