The disadvantage of winning an election
AbstractThis paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implica- tions of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 811.10.
Date of creation: 08 Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Incumbency advantage; Referenda; Popular initiatives; Elections.;
Other versions of this item:
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2010. "The Disadvantage of Winning an Election," Working Papers 439, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Enriqueta Aragones & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2010. "The disadvantage of winning an election," ESE Discussion Papers 194, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-03-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-03-20 (Positive Political Economics)
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