IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/amposc/v48y2004i3p479-495.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Quality Counts: Extending the Strategic Politician Model of Incumbent Deterrence

Author

Listed:
  • Walter J. Stone
  • L. Sandy Maisel
  • Cherie D. Maestas

Abstract

Competitive elections are essential to representative democracy. Competition in U.S. House elections is low in part because incumbents have strategic advantages that deter strong potential candidates from running. Many observers conclude that incumbents retain their seats without full accountability to the electorate, but the mechanisms of deterrence have never been fully explored from the perspective of strong potential candidates. Based on a survey of potential House candidates designed to capture perceptions of incumbents' personal quality and reelection prospects, we find strong evidence for the “strategic politicians” thesis (Black 1972; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). We extend the logic of the strategic model first by showing that incumbents' reelection prospects are affected by their personal quality and second by demonstrating that incumbents' personal qualities deter strong challengers from running, independent of their electoral prospects. Our findings prompt us to suggest revisions to our understanding of competition and representation in contemporary House elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Walter J. Stone & L. Sandy Maisel & Cherie D. Maestas, 2004. "Quality Counts: Extending the Strategic Politician Model of Incumbent Deterrence," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 479-495, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:3:p:479-495
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00082.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00082.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00082.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Carsey & William Berry, 2014. "What’s a losing party to do? The calculus of contesting state legislative elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 251-273, July.
    2. Carmen Beviá & Humberto Llavador, 2009. "The Informational Value of Incumbency," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(5), pages 773-796, October.
    3. Luciana Moscoso Boedo, 2010. "Who Runs Against the Incumbent? Candidate Entry Decisions," Working papers DTE 494, CIDE, División de Economía.
    4. Enriqueta Aragonès & Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2014. "Incumbency (dis)advantage when citizens can propose Abstract:This paper analyses the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to citizen proposals such as the ," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2014/314, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Alexander, Dan, 2021. "Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 163-185.
    6. Kei Kawai, 2013. "Campaign Finance in U.S. House Elections," 2013 Meeting Papers 1158, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Cherie D. Maestas & Cynthia R. Rugeley, 2008. "Assessing the “Experience Bonus” Through Examining Strategic Entry, Candidate Quality, and Campaign Receipts in U.S. House Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 520-535, July.
    8. Enriqueta Aragonès & Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2010. "The disadvantage of winning an election," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 811.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    9. Nicolas Gavoille, 2021. "Pay for politicians and campaign spending: evidence from the French municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 455-477, September.
    10. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine & Paul Redmond, 2012. "Incumbent-Quality Advantage and Counterfactual Electoral Stagnation in the U.S. Senate," Working Papers 201218, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    11. Jay Goodliffe, 2005. "When Do War Chests Deter?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(2), pages 249-277, April.
    12. Gilles Serra, 2018. "The electoral strategies of a populist candidate: Does charisma discourage experience and encourage extremism?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 45-73, January.
    13. James Adams & Samuel Merrill, 2013. "Policy-seeking candidates who value the valence attributes of the winner," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 139-161, April.
    14. Jordan Kujala, 2020. "Donors, Primary Elections, and Polarization in the United States," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(3), pages 587-602, July.
    15. Markus Müller, 2009. "Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/114, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    16. Greg Vonnahme, 2014. "A preferential attachment model of campaign contributions in state legislative elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 235-249, April.
    17. Woon, Jonathan & Kanthak, Kristin, 2019. "Elections, ability, and candidate honesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 735-753.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:3:p:479-495. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5907 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.