Optimal Labor Contracts With Non-Contractible Human Capital
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 116-89.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
human resources ; workers ; moral hazard ; contracts ; enterprises ; wages;
Other versions of this item:
- Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu & Bentley MacLeod, W., 1989. "Optimal labor contracts with non-contractible human capital," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 385-402, December.
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