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A note on hospital financing: local financing vs. central financing

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  • Raffaele Mosca

Abstract

This note tries to study how hospital behaviors, with reference to interhospital collaboration or competition, could be affected by hospital financing systems. For that this note simulates two scenarios which start with the following baseline scenario: a State, with a set of hospitals, each with all types of wards at a basic level. The evolution of this baseline scenario consists in the evolution of hospitals, that is, in the possibility of hospitals to make some of their wards excel. The State has a budget, for the evolution of this baseline scenario, which can be used by two financing systems: either by a "local financing", i.e., by splitting the budget among the hospitals so that each hospital is managing its own portion of the budget by pursuing the individual benefit, or by a "central financing", i.e., by not splitting the budget among the hospitals so that the State is the sole manager of the budget, by pursuing the benefit of the whole community. The conclusions seem to be that: in the local financing system hospitals tend to diversify their excellences, while in the central financing system the State tends to create poles of excellence.

Suggested Citation

  • Raffaele Mosca, 2022. "A note on hospital financing: local financing vs. central financing," Papers 2202.08102, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2202.08102
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