An overlapping generational model of educational investment in a dual labor markets is presented in which education serves both as a screening device and as investment in human capital. Labor market dualism arises not only via the conventional technology (productivity) differential between a primary and a secondary sector, but also by a higher than a labor market clearing wage in the primary sector, to insure no shirking by the workers (an element shared with the efficiency wage theories). The important determinants of the workers' educational investment decision are the degree of discipline in the labor market and the cost of education. Among the three most commonly discussed educational policies of maximizing the number of the educated, maximizing the primary sector employment and maximizing social welfare, the last one, i.e., the most efficient one, leads to a lower level of education subsidy by the government.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center in its series Bulletins with number
7503.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: