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Governing Structural Change And Externalities In Agriculture: Toward A Normative Institutional Economics Of Rural Development

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Petrick, Martin

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Abstract

The paper aims at a conceptual contribution to the normative economic analysis of rural de-velopment (RD) policies. RD is regarded as a problem of interaction between individuals; (lacking) structural change or the (missing) integration of externalities are therefore recon-structed as coordination rather than allocation problems. A social dilemma is taken as the paradigmatic core of normative institutional economics: how can potential gains from coop-eration be realised by way of institutional policy? Starting from a critique of the hitherto dominating welfare economics conception, three principles for institutional policy are de-rived: (1) the realisation of gains from cooperation as the normative, regulative idea, (2) in-centive-compatible self-regulation as the principle of individual action, and (3) institutional-ised competition as the institution-related principle. An application to rural credit markets demonstrates how these principles can be used to structure institutional policy of RD. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG STRUKTURWANDEL UND EXTERNALITÄTEN IN DER LANDWIRTSCHAFT: ANSATZPUNKTE FÜR EINE NORMATIVE INSTITUTIONENÖKONOMIK DER LÄNDLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG Dieser Aufsatz versteht sich als konzeptioneller Beitrag zur normativen ökonomischen Ana-lyse ländlicher Entwicklungspolitik. Ländliche Entwicklung wird als ein Interaktionsproblem von Individuen angesehen; (fehlender) Strukturwandel oder die (Nicht-)Integration von Ex-ternalitäten werden daher als Koordinations- und nicht als Allokationsprobleme rekonstruiert. Ein soziales Dilemma wird als paradigmatischer Kern der normativen Institutionenökonomik eingeführt: wie können durch ordnungspolitische Maßnahmen mögliche Kooperationsgewin-ne realisiert werden? Ausgehend von einer Kritik der bisher dominierenden wohlfahrtsöko-nomischen Konzeption werden drei institutionenökonomische Politikprinzipien abgeleitet: (1) die Realisierung von Kooperationsgewinnen als normative, regulative Idee, (2) anreiz-kompatible Selbststeuerung als handlungsbezogenes Prinzip und (3) institutionalisierter Wett-bewerb als institutionenbezogenes Prinzip. Eine Anwendung auf ländliche Kreditmärkte zeigt, wie diese Prinzipien zur Strukturierung von ländlicher Entwicklungspolitik eingesetzt werden können.

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Paper provided by Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) in its series IAMO Discussion Papers with number 14878.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ags:iamodp:14878

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Related research
Keywords: rural development; institutional economics; welfare economics; social dilemma; Institutionenökonomik; Wohlfahrtsökonomik; soziales Dilemma; ländliche Entwicklung; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; D 63; D 74; Q 18; Q58;

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  1. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Besley, Timothy & Guinnane, Timothy W, 1994. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 491-515, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Guinnane, Timothy W., 1999. "The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 195-228, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Bohm, Peter & Russell, Clifford S., 1985. "Comparative analysis of alternative policy instruments," Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, in: A. V. Kneese† & J. L. Sweeney (ed.), Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 395-460 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sarris, Alexander H & Doucha, Tomas & Mathijs, Erik, 1999. "Agricultural Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe: Implications for Competitiveness and Rural Development," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 305-29, August.
  5. Bullock, David S. & Salhofer, Klaus, 2003. "Judging agricultural policies: a survey," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 225-243, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Petrick, Martin, 2004. "Farm investment, credit rationing, and governmentally promoted credit access in Poland: a cross-sectional analysis," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 275-294, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Martin Petrick, 2004. "A microeconometric analysis of credit rationing in the Polish farm sector," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 31(1), pages 77-101, March.
  8. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-62, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
  13. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1997. "Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(3), pages 661-91.
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  14. Schmitt, Gunther, 1991. "Why Is the Agriculture of Advanced Western Economies Still Organized by Family Farms? Will This Continue to Be So in the Future?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 18(3-4), pages 443-58.
  15. Bromley, Daniel W & Hodge, Ian, 1990. "Private Property Rights and Presumptive Policy Entitlements: Reconsidering the Premises of Rural Policy," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 17(2), pages 197-214.
  16. Dahlman, Carl J, 1979. "The Problem of Externality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 141-62, April.
  17. Pollak, Robert A, 1985. "A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 581-608, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. de Meza, David & Webb, David, 2000. "Does credit rationing imply insufficient lending?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 215-234, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Martin Petrick & Ingo Pies, 2007. "In search for rules that secure gains from cooperation: the heuristic value of social dilemmas for normative institutional economics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 251-271, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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