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Tenure Insecurity, Transaction Costs in the Land Lease Market and their Implications for Gendered Productivity Differentials

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Author Info
Holden, Stein
Bezabih, Mintewab

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Abstract

This study sets out to assess the link between land leasing behavior and productivity differentials between male and female-headed households. A double-moral hazard model allows us to show that landlord’s tenure insecurity leads to sub-optimal level of effort on tenant’s part, via its impact on the likelihood of contract renewal. The landlord’s enforcement ability is also shown to increase the optimal level of effort. The empirical findings support the hypothesis that female heads of households have higher tenant turnover and lower enforcement ability. The results, however, show that contract renewal is not strongly linked to productivity.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia with number 25273.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae06:25273

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Keywords: productivity; female headed households; contract length; enforcement ability; Land Economics/Use; D2; Q12; Q15; C21; C7;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Holden, Stein & Shiferaw, Bekele & Pender, John L., 2001. "Market imperfections and land productivity in the Ethiopian Highlands:," EPTD discussion papers 76, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Jacoby, Hanan G. & Mansuri, Ghazala, 2006. "Incomplete contracts and investment : a study of land tenancy in Pakistan," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3826, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Dhawan, Rajeev, 2001. "Firm size and productivity differential: theory and evidence from a panel of US firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 269-293, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bell, Clive & Zusman, Pinhas, 1976. "A Bargaining Theoretic Approach to Cropsharing Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 578-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bellemare, Marc F. & Barrett, Christopher B., 2003. "An Asset-Risk Model Of Reverse Tenancy," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22132, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-75, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Yin-Wong Cheung & Antonio Garcia Pascual, 2004. "Market Structure, Technology Spillovers, and Persistence in Productivity Differentials," The International Journal of Applied Economics, Department of General Business, Southeastern Louisiana University, vol. 1(1), pages 1-23, September. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Deininger, Klaus & Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Alemu, Tekie, 2007. "Assessing the functioning of land rental markets in Ethiopia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4442, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Holden, Stein T. & Deininger, Klaus & Ghebru, Hosaena, 2007. "Impact of Land Certification on Land Rental Market Participation in Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia," MPRA Paper 5211, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Quisumbing, Agnes R. & Pandolfelli, Lauren, 2009. "Promising approaches to address the needs of poor female farmers: Resources, constraints, and interventions," IFPRI discussion papers 882, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
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