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Versicherungen als effizientes Mittel zur Risikotragung von Naturgefahren

Author

Listed:
  • Franz Sinabell
  • Thomas Url

    (WIFO)

Abstract

Die von Naturgefahren (darunter Hochwasser, Lawinen, Erdbeben) ausgelösten Schäden nahmen in den letzten Jahren zu. Aus volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht soll das Schadensausmaß möglichst gering gehalten werden, existenzbedrohende Situationen sollen von der Bevölkerung abgewendet werden. Dem Risikoausgleich, sei es durch Versicherungen oder durch öffentliche Beihilfen, kommt dabei eine zentrale Rolle zu. In einem internationalen Vergleich wird untersucht, wie einzelne Länder diesen Risikoausgleich gestalten. Auf Basis der ökonomischen Literatur werden Kriterien für effiziente Formen der Risikotragung entwickelt. Auswertungen von zurückliegenden Schadereignissen und die Einstufung der Gefährdung von Liegenschaften werden genutzt, um Schadenspotentiale zu illustrieren.

Suggested Citation

  • Franz Sinabell & Thomas Url, 2006. "Versicherungen als effizientes Mittel zur Risikotragung von Naturgefahren," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 28181, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wfo:wstudy:28181
    Note: With English abstract.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Franz Sinabell & Georg Böhs & Stephanie Lackner & Dieter Pennerstorfer & Helmut Habersack & Lukas Löschner & Roswitha Samek & Bernhard Schober & Walter Seher, 2016. "Naturgefahren und die Belastung von Landeshaushalten," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 58785, February.
    2. Franz Sinabell & Oliver Fritz & Wilfried Puwein & Gerhard Streicher, 2009. "Eine volkswirtschaftliche Analyse der Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 35281, February.
    3. Thomas Url, 2008. "Wahrscheinlichkeits-Überschreitungskurven für Hochwasserkatastrophen in Österreich," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 34140, February.
    4. Franz Sinabell & Dieter Pennerstorfer & Stephanie Lackner, 2016. "Eine volkswirtschaftliche Analyse der Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung in Österreich. Die Bereitstellung von Schutzgütern bisher und der künftige Bedarf," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 58854, February.
    5. Unterberger, Christian & Hudson, Paul & Botzen, W.J. Wouter & Schroeer, Katharina & Steininger, Karl W., 2019. "Future Public Sector Flood Risk and Risk Sharing Arrangements: An Assessment for Austria," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 153-163.
    6. Franz Sinabell & Mark Sommer & Mathias Kirchner, 2018. "Volkswirtschaftliche Analyse der Hochwasserschutzinvestitionen des BMVIT. Aktualisierung," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 61116, February.
    7. Thomas Url, 2013. "Lebensversicherung leidet weiterhin unter niedrigem Zinsniveau," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 86(9), pages 769-779, September.

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