Choix d'investissement sous incertitude des gestionnaires des réseaux de distribution (GRD) en Europe à l'horizon 2030
AbstractDistribution activities have been the least studied domain of the electricity sector; over the last few years though, strong debates emerged with regards to the future. Indeed, this activity might soon undergo some deep structural changes, particularly as smart technologies are deployed: theses technologies could strongly impact the current business cases of the DSOs, along with the regulation now in effect, at a time when numerous uncertainties weigh on the distributors choices of investments. This thesis investigates the distributors’ business models evolutions in Europe for the next 20 years, based on technological, macroeconomic and geographical parameters. It proposes an original approach, both theoretical and analytical, to better understand the future world of DSOs. At first, it introduces the notion of “technologies with natural potential” in order to study the optimal development of the different technologies, by geographical context and macroeconomic scenarios. From these results, it then defines various possible evolutions of the distribution activities. Crossing these futures with the various possible investment strategies for the DSOs makes it possible to define the future business models of the European DSOs, according to various combinations of smart technologies displayed and contrasted geographical contexts. In its last part, the thesis studies the predictable changes in the relation DSO / regulator, using a formalization based on the Games Theory; this work is complemented by identifying the different lock-in effects (using the approach described in Brian Arthur’s studies) that could hinder the emergence of smart technologies, and the possible solutions.
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/10862 and published in 2012.
DSO; lock-in; regulation; smart technologies; distribution networks; electricity networks; Industrial organization; GRD; Système électrique; Régulation; Réseaux de distribution;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
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