IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wsi/igtrxx/v12y2010i01ns0219198910002520.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Note On Discrete Bid First-Price Auction With General Value Distribution

Author

Listed:
  • GANGSHU (GEORGE) CAI

    (Department of Management, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA)

  • PETER R. WURMAN

    (Kiva Systems, Inc., 225 Wildwood Avenue, Woburn, MA 01801, USA)

  • XITING GONG

    (Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China)

Abstract

This paper evaluates the discrete bid first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction in a model with a general value distribution. We show that a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists for the discrete bid FPSB auction. We further prove that the discrete bid FPSB equilibrium conditionally converges to that of a continuous bid FPSB auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Gangshu (George) Cai & Peter R. Wurman & Xiting Gong, 2010. "A Note On Discrete Bid First-Price Auction With General Value Distribution," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(01), pages 75-81.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:01:n:s0219198910002520
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002520
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198910002520
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1142/S0219198910002520?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    2. Hans Haller & Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "A discrete model of discriminatory price auctions - an alternative to Menezes-Monteiro," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-08, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Rasch, Alexander & Zeppenfeld, Christopher, 2016. "Preferences and Decision Support in Competitive Bidding," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145849, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Itzhak Rasooly & Carlos Gavidia-Calderon, 2020. "The importance of being discrete: on the inaccuracy of continuous approximations in auction theory," Papers 2006.03016, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    3. Mill, Wladislaw & Morgan, John, 2022. "Competition between friends and foes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alvarez, Francisco & Mazon, Cristina, 2007. "Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: A discrete model with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(1), pages 253-266, May.
    2. Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Competition of E-Commerce Intermediaries," Working Papers 675, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    3. Miettinen, Paavo, 2017. "Information acquisition during a descending price auction with asymmetrically informed players," Research Discussion Papers 5/2017, Bank of Finland.
    4. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
    5. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
    6. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Post-Print hal-01021718, HAL.
    7. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September.
    8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On second-price auctions and imperfect competition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 901-909, November.
    9. Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2015. "Financing bidders in takeover contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 534-557.
    10. Rene Kirkegaard, 2005. "A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Working Papers 0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005.
    11. Malueg, David A. & Orzach, Ram, 2009. "Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 177-180, November.
    12. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2017. "When should bidders learn reserve prices?," ERC Working Papers 1712, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    13. Florencia Gabrielli, 2014. "Econometrics of First Price Auctions: a Survey of the Theoretical and Applied Literature," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 60, pages 77-118, January-D.
    14. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortaçsu, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
    15. Sumit Joshi & Yu-An Sun & Poorvi L. Vora, 2011. "Price Discrimination And Privacy: A Note," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(01), pages 83-92.
    16. Kassas, Bachir & Palma, Marco A. & Anderson, David P., 2017. "Fine-Tuning Willingness-To-Pay Estimates in Second Price Auctions," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258466, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    17. Pascal Courty & Daniel Rondeau & Maurice Doyon, 2015. "Unbundling Truthful Revelation when Auctioning Bundled Goods," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2512-2517.
    18. Veronika Grimm, 2004. "On Procurement Auctions Of Complementary Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    19. Soumyakanti Chakraborty & Anup K. Sen & Amitava Bagchi, 2015. "Addressing the valuation problem in multi-round combinatorial auctions," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 1145-1160, October.
    20. Feinerman, Eli & Gardebroek, Cornelis, 2005. "Stimulating Organic Farming Via Public Services and an Auction-Based Subsidy," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24723, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    First-price sealed-bid auction; discrete bid; Bayesian Nash equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:01:n:s0219198910002520. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tai Tone Lim (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.