A discrete model of discriminatory price auctions - an alternative to Menezes-Monteiro

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

A discrete model of discriminatory price auctions - an alternative to Menezes-Monteiro

Author Info

Hans Haller
Yvan Lengwiler

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Yvan Lengwiler

Abstract

Menezes and Monteiro, Math. Soc. Sci. (1995), show that a multi-unit discriminatory price auction does not have a pure strategy equilibrium unless one imposes some rather special conditions on the demand functions. This non-existence result might indicate a problem either with the underlying auction procedure (as Menezes and Monteiro suggest) or with the modelling approach (as we suggest). We observe that the non-existence problem disappears if bids must come in multiples of smallest units --- a realistic feature. Moreover, we show that most of the analysis can be recast in a discrete action model.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 1998-08.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:1998-08

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20551
Web page: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/fedsorder.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 1995. "Existence of equilibrium in a discriminatory price auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 285-292, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Menezes F. M. & Monteiro, P. K., 1996. "Existence of equilibrium in a descriminatory price auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 60-61, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
V.V. Chari & Robert J. Weber, 1992. "How the U.S. Treasury should auction its debt," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-12. [Downloadable!]
Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-28, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.