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Evolution With Endogenous Mutations

Author

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  • IVAR KOLSTAD

    (Chr. Michelsen Institute, P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen, N-5892 Bergen, Norway)

Abstract

Bergin and Lipman (1996) prove that equilibrium selection in the evolutionary dynamics of Kandoriet al. (1993) and Young (1993), is not robust to variations in mutation rates across states. Specifically, a risk dominant equilibrium can be selected against if mutation rates are higher in its basin of attraction than elsewhere. Van Damme and Weibull (1998) model mutations as a compromise between payoff losses and control costs, which implies lower mutation rates in the risk dominant equilibrium. This paper argues that this result is not driven by control costs, but by players focusing on payoff losses when choosing mutation rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivar Kolstad, 2005. "Evolution With Endogenous Mutations," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(02), pages 229-240.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:n:s0219198905000508
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000508
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1998. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Other publications TiSEM 197ad72d-2cb6-49c3-a875-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. repec:hhs:iuiwop:501 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kolstad, Ivar, 2007. "The evolution of social norms: With managerial implications," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 58-72, February.
    2. Tatur, Tymon, 2023. "Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution; mutation; equilibrium selection; JEL classification numbers: C73;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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