Step-by-Step Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
AbstractThis paper considers the extension of Ellison's (2000) "Radius-Modified Coradius" Theorem from the uniform-mutations case to a general stochastic setting. A modified theorem is presented, with a crucial role now played by the most probable evolutionary paths between states. The form of such paths is liable to change outside of the uniform mutations case, with concomitant effects on both long-run selection and expected waiting times. An algorithm for finding these paths is offered, and used to demonstrate the continued optimality of "step-by-step" evolution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2003-W08.
Length: 16 pages
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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-03-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2003-03-10 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2003-03-10 (Game Theory)
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