Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Step-by-Step Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

This paper considers the extension of Ellison's (2000) "Radius-Modified Coradius" Theorem from the uniform-mutations case to a general stochastic setting. A modified theorem is presented, with a crucial role now played by the most probable evolutionary paths between states. The form of such paths is liable to change outside of the uniform mutations case, with concomitant effects on both long-run selection and expected waiting times. An algorithm for finding these paths is offered, and used to demonstrate the continued optimality of "step-by-step" evolution.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2003/W8/Steps.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2003-W08.

as in new window
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0308

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  2. William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 1995. "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory," NBER Working Papers 5291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Thomas Norman, 2003. "The Evolution of Coordination under Inertia," Economics Papers 2003-W06, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  4. BERGIN, James & LIPMAN, Bart, 1994. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," CORE Discussion Papers 1994055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
  6. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  7. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  8. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2002. "Adaptive Play by Idiosyncratic Agents," Economics Series Working Papers 89, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. Adam Szeidl & In Ho Lee & Akos Valentinyi, 2001. "Contagion and State Dependent Mutations," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0104, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maxine Collett).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.