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Military Conscription and the (Socially) Optimal Number of Boots on the Ground

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  • Peter Berck
  • Jonathan Lipow

Abstract

In this article, we develop a model of military manpower mobilization. We use the model to evaluate the efficacy of volunteer‐ and conscription‐based manpower systems within a framework of social welfare maximization. We find that neither conscription nor a volunteer approach is likely to be “first best” because of asymmetries of information and constraints on the military pay structure. We then modify the general model by considering the possibility that recruits with high civilian productivity are also more capable soldiers and find that, under such circumstances, conscription may be a more benign form of manpower mobilization than previously understood. We also consider and evaluate various alternatives available to militaries attempting to minimize the welfare losses associated with manpower mobilization.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Berck & Jonathan Lipow, 2011. "Military Conscription and the (Socially) Optimal Number of Boots on the Ground," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(1), pages 95-106, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:78:y:2011:i:1:p:95-106
    DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-78.1.95
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Warner & Sebastian Negrusa, 2005. "Evasion costs and the theory Of conscription," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 83-100.
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    5. Casey B. Mulligan, 2005. "Conscription as Regulation," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 7(1), pages 85-111.
    6. Curtis J. Simon & Sebastian Negrusa & John T. Warner, 2010. "Educational Benefits And Military Service: An Analysis Of Enlistment, Reenlistment, And Veterans' Benefit Usage 1991–2005," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(4), pages 1008-1031, October.
    7. Ross, Thomas W, 1994. "Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 109-131, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bäckström, Peter, 2023. "Empirical Essays on Military Service and the Labour Market," Umeå Economic Studies 1012, Umeå University, Department of Economics.

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