Raising An Army: A Positive Theory Of Military Recruitment
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) with number 88-08.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1988
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Other versions of this item:
- Ross, Thomas W, 1994. "Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 109-31, April.
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- Yew-Kwang Ng, 2008. "Why is the Military Draft Common? Conscription and Increasing Returns," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 9(2), pages 373-384, November.
- Timothy J. Perri, 2010. "The Draft and the Quality of Military Personnel," Working Papers 10-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- Levy, Amnon, 2005. "Deterrence Capacity, Relative Performance, Adjustment Costs, Hazard, Killing Aversion and the Optimal Enlistment Age," Economics Working Papers wp05-01, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
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- Siu, Henry, 2006.
"The fiscal role of conscription in the US World War II effort,"
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- Siu, Henry E., 2008. "The fiscal role of conscription in the U.S. World War II effort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 1094-1112, September.
- Jonathan Lipow & Jay Simon, 2014. "Probability segmenting and the social cost of draft evasion," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 307-312.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, 2004.
"Population and Regulation,"
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- repec:ial:wpaper:5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Levy, Amnon, 2004. "Should They Be Enlisted at Eighteen Years of Age?," Economics Working Papers wp04-04, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
- John T. Warner & Beth J. Asch, 2001. "The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 169-192, Spring.
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