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The political economy of voluntary public service

Author

Listed:
  • Arup Bose

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

  • Debashis Pal

    (University of Cincinnati)

  • David E. M. Sappington

    (University of Florida)

Abstract

We characterize the voluntary public service policy that minimizes the expected cost of delivering a public service (e.g., jury or military service). We then examine whether a majority rule voting procedure will implement the voluntary public service policy (VPS) whenever it entails lower expected cost than mandatory public service (MPS). We find that majority rule often favors MPS in the sense that majority rule implements MPS when VPS would secure the requisite public service at lower expected cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Arup Bose & Debashis Pal & David E. M. Sappington, 2021. "The political economy of voluntary public service," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 29-61, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00752-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00752-x
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