Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 37 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
Other versions of this item:
- Tom Ross, 1988. "Raising An Army: A Positive Theory Of Military Recruitment," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 88-08, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
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