I consider the role of conscription as a fiscal shock absorber in times of war. Conscription of military personnel allows the fiscal authority to minimize wartime government expenditure, and hence, minimize tax distortions associated with war finance. I develop a simple dynamic general equilibrium model to articulate this view, and calibrate the model to mimic the U.S. World War II experience. Analysis of the calibrated model indicates that the value of conscription as a fiscal policy tool is quantitatively large.
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Paper provided by UBC Department of Economics in its series UBC Departmental Archives with number
siu-06-04-26-12-42-20.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Casey Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, 2004.
"Conscription as Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
10558, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
R. Anton Braun & Ellen R. McGrattan, 1993.
"The Macroeconomics of War and Peace,"
NBER Chapters,
in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993, Volume 8, pages 197-258
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
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