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Stakeholder Orientations and Cost Management

Author

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  • Xiaotao (Kelvin) Liu
  • Xiaoxia Liu
  • Colin D. Reid

Abstract

We examine the effect of stakeholder orientation on firms' cost management as proxied by selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) cost stickiness. Using a sample of 19,783 firm‐years, we find that customer and employee orientation are associated with greater SG&A cost stickiness. Furthermore, the effect of customer orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is more prominent in firms where SG&A costs create high future value, growth firms, and firms with strong corporate governance. In contrast, the effect of employee orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is stronger in firms where SG&A costs create low future value, mature firms, and firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, the association between customer orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with efficiency considerations (i.e., adjustment costs). In contrast, the association between employee orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with agency motives such as empire building or “a preference for a quiet life.” In sum, we provide evidence that corporate orientation toward different stakeholders can have different efficiency implications in the context of SG&A resource adjustments and cost management. Attitude à l'égard des parties prenantes et gestion des coûts Les auteurs se demandent quelle est l'incidence sur la gestion des coûts au sein des entreprises de l'attitude à l'égard des parties prenantes, évaluée à l'aune de la persistance des frais généraux et des frais de vente et d'administration (FGFVA). L'analyse d'un échantillon de 19 783 sociétés‐années révèle que l'orientation clients et l'orientation employés sont associées à une plus grande persistance des FGFVA. En outre, l'incidence de l'orientation clients sur la persistance des FGFVA est plus marquée dans les sociétés où les FGFVA engendrent une valeur future élevée, les sociétés en phase de croissance et les sociétés dans lesquelles la gouvernance d'entreprise est rigoureuse. En revanche, l'incidence de l'orientation employés sur la persistance des FGFVA est plus marquée dans les sociétés où les FGFVA engendrent une faible valeur future, les sociétés en phase de maturité et les sociétés dans lesquelles la gouvernance d'entreprise laisse à désirer. Globalement, le lien entre l'orientation clients et la persistance des FGFVA cadre avec les considérations relatives à l'efficience (c'est‐à‐dire les coûts d'ajustement). Au contraire, le lien entre l'orientation employés et la persistance des FGFVA cadre avec les motifs de délégation tels que l'ambition financière ou l'aspiration à une vie paisible. En somme, les constatations des auteurs confirment que l'attitude à l'égard des différentes parties prenantes peut avoir des répercussions distinctes sur l'efficience dans un contexte d'ajustement des ressources dévolues aux FGFVA et de gestion des coûts.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaotao (Kelvin) Liu & Xiaoxia Liu & Colin D. Reid, 2019. "Stakeholder Orientations and Cost Management," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 486-512, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:36:y:2019:i:1:p:486-512
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12389
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