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Comparative Analysis of Executive Compensation in the Republic of Serbia and EU Countries

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  • Matović Ivana Marinović

    (Addiko Bank AD Belgrade, Serbia)

Abstract

Executive compensations have a strong motivation role in contemporary business organizations. Adequate models of compensation enable attracting and retaining the high-capacity managers. This way, business organization conquers and maintains the competitive position in the context of globalization. It is necessary to align the executive compensation with the business organization’s strategy, which requires careful process of planning, done by the highest levels of management and ownership. The main objective of the paper is to explore and compare the structure and the level of executive compensation in the Republic of Serbia and EU countries. The paper focuses on executive compensation components, primarily long-term and short-term incentives, as well as sallary and benefits. A comparative analysis of executive compensation models was performed to explain the differences in the observed countries.The study found large and disproportionate differences in the executive compensation levels, conditioned mostly by the economic development of the observed economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Matović Ivana Marinović, 2019. "Comparative Analysis of Executive Compensation in the Republic of Serbia and EU Countries," Economic Themes, Sciendo, vol. 57(2), pages 181-200, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:ecothe:v:57:y:2019:i:2:p:181-200:n:4
    DOI: 10.2478/ethemes-2019-0011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Management; executive compensation; business organization; comparative analysis; the Republic of Serbia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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