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Long-Term Orientation In Family And Non-Family Firms: A Bayesian Analysis

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Author Info
Jörn Hendrich Block
Andreas Thams

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Abstract

A stronger long-term orientation is considered a competitive advantage of family firms relative to non-family firms. In this study, we use panel data of U.S. firms and analyze this proposition. Our findings are surprising. Only in when the family is involved in the management of the firm is the firm found to invest more in long-term projects relative to a non-family firm. We also find that investment in long-term projects in family firms is determined less by cash flow variations than for non-family firms. Managerial implications of our findings are discussed. Our hypotheses are tested using Bayesian methods.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany in its series SFB 649 Discussion Papers with number SFB649DP2007-059.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
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Handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2007-059

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Related research
Keywords: Family Firm; Long-term Orientation; Myopia; Bayesian Analysis; Agency Theory; Stewardship Theory; Investment Policy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Bayesian Analysis
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bronwyn H. Hall, Jacques Mairesse, Lee Branstetter, and Bruno Crepon., 1998. "Does Cash Flow Cause Investment and R& D: An Exploration Using Panel Data for French, Japanese, and United States Scientific Firms," Economics Working Papers 98-260, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Stein, Jeremy C, 1988. "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 61-80, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bronwyn H. Hall., 1992. "Investment and Research and Development at the Firm Level: Does the Source of Financing Matter?," Economics Working Papers 92-194, University of California at Berkeley.
    Other versions:
  4. Leamer, Edward E, 1973. "Multicollinearity: A Bayesian Interpretation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 55(3), pages 371-80, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eddleston, Kimberly A. & Kellermanns, Franz W., 2007. "Destructive and productive family relationships: A stewardship theory perspective," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 545-565, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Becht, Marco & Roell, Ailsa, 1999. "Blockholdings in Europe:: An international comparison1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1049-1056, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hirshleifer, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1992. "Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 437-70. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Narayanan, M P, 1985. " Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1469-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sebastian Braun & Nadja Dwenger & Dorothea Kübler, 2007. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2007-070, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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