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Inherited corporate control and returns on investment

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  • Johan Eklund
  • Johanna Palmberg
  • Daniel Wiberg

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on management in family firms by investigating how succession in family firms affects returns on investment. The identities of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman of the board (COB) were used to establish whether the management of the firm can be characterized as founder, descendant, or external management. A unique, unbalanced panel data set on listed Swedish firms covering the period from 1990 to 2005 was used in the analysis. The results show that founder management has a positive effect on the returns on investment in family firms, whereas descendant management has a negative impact. An external CEO as a successor in family firms leads to more efficient investment policies with increased firm value as a result. That is, when studying corporate governance in family firms it is important to account for what type of management the firm has. Further studies are required to understand the relationship between ownership, control, management, and firm performance. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Johan Eklund & Johanna Palmberg & Daniel Wiberg, 2013. "Inherited corporate control and returns on investment," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 419-431, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:41:y:2013:i:2:p:419-431
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-012-9432-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo L. Giménez & José Antonio Novo, 2015. "Family Firm Succession," Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica 0058, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia.
    2. Anup Banerjee & Mattias Nordqvist & Karin Hellerstedt, 2020. "The role of the board chair—A literature review and suggestions for future research," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(6), pages 372-405, November.
    3. Flamini, Giulia & Pittino, Daniel & Visintin, Francesca, 2022. "Family leadership, family involvement and mutuality HRM practices in family SMEs," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2).
    4. Timothy Mathews & Tim Blumentritt, 2015. "A sequential choice model of family business succession," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 15-37, June.
    5. Eduardo L. Giménez & José Antonio Novo, 2020. "A Theory of Succession in Family Firms," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 96-120, March.
    6. Valentina Peruzzi, 2017. "Does family ownership structure affect investment-cash flow sensitivity? Evidence from Italian SMEs," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(43), pages 4378-4393, September.
    7. Bodolica, Virginia & Spraggon, Martin & Zaidi, Sahar, 2015. "Boundary management strategies for governing family firms: A UAE-based case study," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 684-693.
    8. Sevin Gurarda & Emre Ozsoz & Abidin Ates, 2016. "Corporate Governance Rating and Ownership Structure in the Case of Turkey," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 4(2), pages 1-16, April.
    9. Srinivas Raghavendra & Petri T. Piiroinen, 2019. "Conflict as a closure: A Kaleckian model of growth and distribution under financialization," ICAE Working Papers 96, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.
    10. Waldkirch, Matthias, 2020. "Non-family CEOs in family firms: Spotting gaps and challenging assumptions for a future research agenda," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1).
    11. José António Porfírio & Tiago Carrilho & Joseph Hassid & Ricardo Rodrigues, 2019. "Family Business Succession in Different National Contexts: A Fuzzy-Set QCA Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(22), pages 1-17, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family ownership; Corporate governance; External management; Succession; Returns on investment; G32; G34; C23; L25; L26;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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