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The Effects of Pay Incentives on Teacher Absenteeism

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  • Stephen L. Jacobson
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    Abstract

    This study examines the effects of pay incentives on teacher absence in one New York district. Paired sample t-tests of 292 teachers revealed that teacher absence declined significantly and perfect attendance rose from 8 percent to 34 percent during the first year of an attendance incentive plan. The study also revealed that the significant reduction in sick leave was accompanied by a significant increase in the use of personal days. The implications of these findings for practice and future research are discussed.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.

    Volume (Year): 24 (1989)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 280-286

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    Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:24:y:1989:i:2:p:280-286

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    Web page: http://jhr.uwpress.org/

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    Cited by:
    1. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2009. "Performance Pay as an Incentive for Lower Absence Rates in Britain," MPRA Paper 18238, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Kaiser, Carl R., 1996. "Employee absence incentives in the welfare state: Toward explaining cross-national differences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 89-103.
    3. Herrmann, Mariesa A. & Rockoff, Jonah E., 2013. "Do menstrual problems explain gender gaps in absenteeism and earnings?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 12-22.
    4. Martin, Stephanie M., 2010. "The determinants of school district salary incentives: An empirical analysis of, where and why," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1143-1153, December.
    5. Das, J. & Dercon, S. & Habyarimana, J. & Krishnan, P., 2004. "Teacher Shocks and Student Learning: Evidence from Zambia," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 0514, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Billger, Sherrilyn M., 2007. "Principals as Agents? Investigating Accountability in the Compensation and Performance of School Principals," IZA Discussion Papers 2662, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Randy A. Ehrenberg & Daniel I. Rees & REric L. Ehrenberg, 1991. "School District Leave Policies, Teacher Absenteeism, and Student Achievement," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 26(1), pages 72-105.
    8. Kaiser, Carl P., 1998. "What do we know about employee absence behavior? An interdisciplinary interpretation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 79-96.
    9. Emiliana Vegas & Ilana Umansky, 2005. "Improving Teaching and Learning through Effective Incentives : What Can We Learn from Education Reforms in Latin America?," World Bank Other Operational Studies 8694, The World Bank.

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