A Simple Model of Pharmaceutical Price Dynamics
AbstractBranded pharmaceutical firms use price and promotional strategy to manage public knowledge about their drugs. We propose a dynamic theory of pharmaceutical pricing and conduct an exploratory empirical analysis inspired by the theory. Our theory predicts a pattern of increasing prices and decreasing promotional activities over a drug's life cycle. Prices are kept low and advertising levels high early in the life cycle in order to build public knowledge about the drug. As knowledge grows, prices rise and advertising falls. If the management of this stock is important enough, this tendency of prices to rise can overwhelm the price-decreasing effect of entry by generic competitors late in the drug life cycle. We argue that our theory of price dynamics explains empirical regularities in this industry.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 46 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jie Chen & John Rizzo, 2012. "Pricing dynamics and product quality: the case of antidepressant drugs," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 279-300, February.
- Paul Missios & Ida Ferrara, 2010.
"Pricing of Drugs with Heterogeneous Health Insurance Coverage,"
026, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
- Ferrara, Ida & Missios, Paul, 2012. "Pricing of drugs with heterogeneous health insurance coverage," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 440-456.
- Henry G. Grabowski & David B. Ridley & Kevin A. Schulman, 2007. "Entry and competition in generic biologics," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4-5), pages 439-451.
- Lee G. Branstetter & Chirantan Chatterjee & Matthew Higgins, 2011. "Regulation and Welfare: Evidence from Paragraph IV Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry," NBER Working Papers 17188, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2004. "Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1463R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2005.
- Vincenzo Atella & Jay Bhattacharya & Lorenzo Carbonari, 2008.
"Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation: Evidence from US and Italy,"
NBER Working Papers
14567, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vincenzo Atella & Jay Bhattacharya & Lorenzo Carbonari, 2008. "Pharmaceutical industry, drug quality and regulation. Evidence from US and Italy," CEIS Research Paper 138, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 16 Dec 2008.
- Rosemary J. Avery & Donald S. Kenkel & Dean R. Lillard & Alan D. Mathios, 2006.
"Regulating Advertisements: The Case of Smoking Cessation Products,"
NBER Working Papers
12001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rosemary Avery & Donald Kenkel & Dean Lillard & Alan Mathios, 2007. "Regulating advertisements: the case of smoking cessation products," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 185-208, April.
- Patricia M. Danzon & Eric L. Keuffel, 2013. "Regulation of the Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology Industry," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson & Y. Richard Wang, 2006. "Intellectual Property and Marketing," NBER Working Papers 12577, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Panattoni, Laura E., 2011. "The effect of Paragraph IV decisions and generic entry before patent expiration on brand pharmaceutical firms," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 126-145, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.