IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v40y1997i2p495-509.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Regulation of Fuel Economy and the Demand for "Light Trucks."

Author

Listed:
  • Godek, Paul E

Abstract

The Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard mandates fleet-average miles-per-gallon minimums for passenger vehicles sold in the United States. Among other things, the standard is intended to induce consumers to substitute small cars for large cars. While the standard has reduced the average weight of cars, it has also stimulated the demand for an Increasingly popular class of vehicles known as light trucks. The substitution to light trucks has mitigated, but not eliminated, the deleterious effects of the standard on vehicle safety. The effect of the standard on car weights and light-truck sales provides an opportunity to observe a novel manifestation of Sam Peltzman's "offsetting-behavior" hypothesis. That effect and others are analyzed here in the context of the political economy of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Godek, Paul E, 1997. "The Regulation of Fuel Economy and the Demand for "Light Trucks."," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 495-509, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:40:y:1997:i:2:p:495-509
    DOI: 10.1086/467381
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467381
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/467381?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521377003.
    2. Crandall, Robert W & Graham, John D, 1989. "The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 97-118, April.
    3. Peterson, Steven & Hoffer, George & Millner, Edward, 1995. "Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 251-264, October.
    4. John E. Kwoka, 1983. "The Limits of Market-Oriented Regulatory Techniques: The Case of Automotive Fuel Economy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 695-704.
    5. Paul E. Godek, 1991. "Foreign Profits and the Political Economy of Quotas," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 11(1), pages 123-134, Spring/Su.
    6. Kleit, Andrew N, 1990. "The Effect of Annual Changes in Automobile Fuel Economy Standards," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 151-172, June.
    7. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rasha Ahmed & Kathleen Segerson, 2007. "Emissions Control and the Regulation of Product Markets: The Case of Automobiles," Working papers 2007-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    2. Ando, Amy Whritenour & Brozovic, Nicholas, 2004. "Defensive purchasing and motor-vehicle policy effectiveness," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20404, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Santos, Georgina & Behrendt, Hannah & Maconi, Laura & Shirvani, Tara & Teytelboym, Alexander, 2010. "Part I: Externalities and economic policies in road transport," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 2-45.
    4. Brozovic, Nicholas & Ando, Amy Whritenour, 2009. "Defensive purchasing, the safety (dis)advantage of light trucks, and motor-vehicle policy effectiveness," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 477-493, June.
    5. Timilsina, Govinda R. & Dulal, Hari B., 2009. "Regulatory instruments to control environmental externalities from the transport sector," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 41, pages 80-112.
    6. Timilsina, Govinda R. & Dulal, Hari B., 2009. "A review of regulatory instruments to control environmental externalities from the transport sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4867, The World Bank.
    7. Shiau, Ching-Shin Norman & Michalek, Jeremy J. & Hendrickson, Chris T., 2009. "A structural analysis of vehicle design responses to Corporate Average Fuel Economy policy," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 43(9-10), pages 814-828, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stavins, Robert, 2005. "The Effects of Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation," RFF Working Paper Series dp-05-12, Resources for the Future.
    2. Paul J. Gertler & Manisha Shah, 2011. "Sex Work and Infection: What's Law Enforcement Got to Do with It?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 811-840.
    3. Rasha Ahmed & Kathleen Segerson, 2007. "Emissions Control and the Regulation of Product Markets: The Case of Automobiles," Working papers 2007-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Shiau, Ching-Shin Norman & Michalek, Jeremy J. & Hendrickson, Chris T., 2009. "A structural analysis of vehicle design responses to Corporate Average Fuel Economy policy," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 43(9-10), pages 814-828, November.
    5. Robert W. Crandall, 1992. "Policy Watch: Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 171-180, Spring.
    6. Germà Bel & Óscar Gasulla & Ferran A. Mazaira-Font, 2020. "The effect of health and economic costs on governments' policy responses to COVID-19 crisis, under incomplete information," IREA Working Papers 202008, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jun 2020.
    7. Parry, Ian & Portney, Paul & Harrington, Winston & Gruenspecht, Howard, 2003. "The Economics of Fuel Economy Standards," RFF Working Paper Series dp-03-44, Resources for the Future.
    8. Pizer, William A. & Burtraw, Dallas & Harrington, Winston & Newell, Richard G. & Sanchirico, James N., 2005. "Modeling Economywide versus Sectoral Climate Policies Using Combined Aggregate-Sectoral Models," Discussion Papers 10502, Resources for the Future.
    9. Vereeck, Lode & Vrolix, Klara, 2007. "The social willingness to comply with the law: The effect of social attitudes on traffic fatalities," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 385-408, December.
    10. Tyndall, Justin, 2021. "Pedestrian deaths and large vehicles," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 26.
    11. Asmussen, Katherine E. & Mondal, Aupal & Bhat, Chandra R., 2022. "Adoption of partially automated vehicle technology features and impacts on vehicle miles of travel (VMT)," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 156-179.
    12. McCarthy, Patrick S., 1999. "Public policy and highway safety: a city-wide perspective," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 231-244, March.
    13. McCannon, Bryan C., 2009. "Do less-violent technologies result in less violence? A theoretical investigation applied to the use of tasers by law enforcement," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-36, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7310 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Ando, Amy Whritenour & Brozovic, Nicholas, 2004. "Defensive purchasing and motor-vehicle policy effectiveness," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20404, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    16. Grimm, Michael & Treibich, Carole, 2016. "Why do some motorbike riders wear a helmet and others don’t? Evidence from Delhi, India," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 318-336.
    17. Olof Johansson-Stenman & Peter Martinsson, 2005. "Anyone for higher speed limits? – Self-interested and adaptive political preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 319-331, March.
    18. Parry, Ian W. H., 2004. "Comparing alternative policies to reduce traffic accidents," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 346-368, September.
    19. Clifford Winston & Vikram Maheshri & Fred Mannering, 2006. "An exploration of the offset hypothesis using disaggregate data: The case of airbags and antilock brakes," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 83-99, March.
    20. Berlemann, Michael & Matthes, Andreas, 2014. "Positive externalities from active car safety systems," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 313-329.
    21. Anderson, D. Mark & Sandholt, Sina, 2016. "Booster Seats and Traffic Fatalities among Children," IZA Discussion Papers 10071, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:40:y:1997:i:2:p:495-509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.