Bank of England’s monetary policy committee – assessing the importance and the implication upon monetary policy
AbstractThe monetary policy strategies arround the world have been envolving in the last two decades considerable. In the past, central banks’ have been associated with a „veil of mistery” having at their grounds the so-called policy mistique. Nowadays, the new monetary policy strategy – inflation targeting – promoted by many countries established new coordinates for monetary policy. In this paper we focuse upon the monetary policy committee with a special focus upon the Bank of England’s case, because of the special track of this committee in several fields: interest rates expectations, other asset prices, the communication of the central bankers, publishing the minutes of the committees.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Faculty of Economics, Tibiscus University in Timisoara in its journal Anale. Seria Stiinte Economice. Timisoara.
Volume (Year): XVIII (2012)
Issue (Month): (May)
monetary policy strategy; central bank transparency; voting process; communication strategy; voting orientation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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