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Analysis of retailers’ coalition stability for supply chain based on LCS and stable set

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  • Yong Luo
  • Shi-zhao Wang
  • Xiao-chen Sun
  • Oscar D. Crisalle

Abstract

To attain the general form of stable coalition structure, this paper addressed the problem of retailers’ coalition stability in a two-stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers. A profit gain function was established via introducing market gain coefficient and coalition cost coefficient for different coalition structures. Based on the function, the profit of each retailer in all kinds of coalition structures was analysed, and the general feature of a stable coalition structure was attained by the largest consistent set method and the stable set method. Furthermore, some insights were obtained. For example, stable coalition structures are equidistributed or approximate equidistributed; with supplier’s cost increasing, the size of the retailers’ coalition increases. Finally, the above conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. The results of this paper provide a reference for retailers’ coalition in a supply chain, such as automobile or Information Technology supply chain.

Suggested Citation

  • Yong Luo & Shi-zhao Wang & Xiao-chen Sun & Oscar D. Crisalle, 2016. "Analysis of retailers’ coalition stability for supply chain based on LCS and stable set," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(1), pages 170-185, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:tprsxx:v:54:y:2016:i:1:p:170-185
    DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2015.1055848
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    Cited by:

    1. Heydari, Jafar & Momeni, Behnam, 2021. "Retailers’ coalition and quantity discounts under demand uncertainty," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    2. Peng, Feixiang & Hu, Shubo & Fan, Xuanxuan & Sun, Hui & Zhou, Wei & Guo, Furan & Song, Wenzhuo, 2021. "Sequential coalition formation for wind-thermal combined bidding," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).

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