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Public Economics and International Environmental Policy: The Case of Ozone Layer Preservation

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  • David S. Kelleher

Abstract

While there is growing recognition that international environmental protection constitutes a collective action problem, what is less widely recognized is not only how the objective features of the environmental issue but the dynamics of the policymaking process shape the nature of the collective action problem. How the collective action problem is structured of course impinges critically on the prospects for successfully reaching international agreement to address the problem. Drawing on the fundamental insights of the policy analysis and public economics literatures, the paper seeks to explain in game-theoretic terms the essence of the challenge facing countries in trying to forge agreement to address environmental issues. It points to the critical role of private benefits that are jointly produced in the effort to produce the public benefits of global environmental protection. Focusing on the international effort to protect the ozone layer, the analysis may shed light on why this instance of international policymaking has been widely seen as successful, while the international effort to avert climate change has been less so.

Suggested Citation

  • David S. Kelleher, 2001. "Public Economics and International Environmental Policy: The Case of Ozone Layer Preservation," International Review of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 71-82, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rrpaxx:v:6:y:2001:i:2:p:71-82
    DOI: 10.1080/12294659.2001.10804981
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    2. Murdoch, James C. & Sandler, Todd, 1997. "The voluntary provision of a pure public good: The case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 331-349, February.
    3. Todd Sandler, 1992. "After the Cold War, Secure the Global Commons," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(4), pages 16-23, July.
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