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The environmental Porter hypothesis: theory, evidence, and a model of timing of adoption

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  • Ben Kriechel
  • Thomas Ziesemer

Abstract

The Porter hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We will show that times of adoption will be earlier if the non-adoption tax is higher. The environmental tax will turn the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment generating higher profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax will lead to lower profits (anti-Porter). An evaluation of the empirical literature indicates that the Porter hypothesis will hold even for profit-maximizing firms under multiple market imperfections such as imperfect competition, X-inefficiency, and agency costs. These are more likely to be present in sectors with large firms. In many case studies that we have evaluated, though, we detected an element of explicit or implicit subsidies for environmentally friendly behaviour, which is in line with Pigovian policies.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Economics of Innovation and New Technology.

Volume (Year): 18 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 267-294

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Handle: RePEc:taf:ecinnt:v:18:y:2009:i:3:p:267-294

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Related research

Keywords: environmental policy; strategic trade theory; technology adoption; Porter hypothesis;

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References

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  1. Armin Schmutzler, 1998. "Environmental Regulations and Managerial Myopia," Working Papers 9903, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute.
  2. Stefan Ambec & Paul Lanoie, 2007. "When and why does it pay to be green?," Cahiers de recherche 07-04, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  3. Robert Ayres, 1994. "On economic disequilibrium and free lunch," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(5), pages 435-454, October.
  4. Xepapadeas, Anastasios & de Zeeuw, Aart, 1999. "Environmental Policy and Competitiveness: The Porter Hypothesis and the Composition of Capital," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 165-182, March.
  5. Thomas Roediger-Schluga, 2003. "Some Micro-Evidence on the "Porter Hypothesis" from Austrian VOC Emission Standards," Growth and Change, Gatton College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky, vol. 34(3), pages 359-379.
  6. Eli Berman & Linda T. M. Bui, 2001. "Environmental Regulation And Productivity: Evidence From Oil Refineries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 498-510, August.
  7. Martin Klein & Jaqueline Rothfels, . "Can Environmental Regulation of X-Ineffecient Firms Create a -Double Dividend-?," IWH Discussion Papers 103, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
  8. Karen Palmer & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 1995. "Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 119-132, Fall.
  9. Shunsuke Managi, 2004. "Competitiveness and environmental policies for agriculture: testing the Porter hypothesis," International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 3(3), pages 310-324, January.
  10. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1981. "On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 395-405, July.
  11. Abay Mulatu & Raymond J.G.M. Florax & Cees A.A.M. Withagen, 2001. "Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-039/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  12. Ada Wossink & Frank Wefering, 2003. "Hot spots in animal agriculture, emerging federal environmental policies and the potential for efficiency and innovation offsets," International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 228-242, January.
  13. Hoppe, Heidrun C, 2002. "The Timing of New Technology Adoption: Theoretical Models and Empirical Evidence," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(1), pages 56-76, January.
  14. Smith, V Kerry & Walsh, Randy, 2000. " Do Painless Environmental Policies Exist?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 73-94, July.
  15. Greaker, Mads, 2003. "Strategic environmental policy; eco-dumping or a green strategy?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 692-707, May.
  16. Shunsuke Managi & SJames J. Opaluch & Di Jin & Thomas A. Grigalunas, 2005. "Environmental Regulations and Technological Change in the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(2).
  17. Richard Lajeunesse & Paul Lanoie & Michel Patry, 2001. "Environmental Regulation and Productivity: New Findings on the Porter Analysis," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-53, CIRANO.
  18. Ulph, Alistair, 1996. "Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-281, May.
  19. Simpson, R. David & Bradford, Robert III, 1996. "Taxing Variable Cost: Environmental Regulation as Industrial Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 282-300, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kuckshinrichs, Wilhelm & Kronenberg, Tobias & Hansen, Patrick, 2010. "The social return on investment in the energy efficiency of buildings in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 4317-4329, August.
  2. Wilfried Ehrenfeld, 2012. "Towards a Theory of Climate Innovation - A Model Framework for Analyzing Drivers and Determinants," IWH Discussion Papers 1, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
  3. Simone Borghesi & Giulio Cainelli & Massimiliano Mazzanti, 2012. "Brown Sunsets and Green Dawns in the Industrial Sector: Environmental Innovations, Firm Behavior and the European Emission Trading," Working Papers 2012.03, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. George van Leeuwen & Pierre Mohnen, 2013. "Revisiting the Porter Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis of Green Innovation for the Netherlands," CIRANO Working Papers 2013s-02, CIRANO.
  5. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2011. "The Porter hypothesis and hyperbolic discounting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 167-176.
  6. Giulio Cainelli & Massimiliano Mazzanti & Simone Borghesi, 2012. "The European Emission Trading Scheme and environmental innovation diffusion: Empirical analyses using Italian CIS data," Working Papers 201201, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.

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