Endogenous antitrust: cross-country evidence on the impact of competition-enhancing policies on productivity
AbstractThis article presents empirical evidence regarding the effect of simultaneous antitrust and trade policy on productivity. We find that treating antitrust across countries as an exogenous policy overestimates the impact of competition on productivity by as much as 18%.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 15 (2008)
Issue (Month): 11 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Joan-Ramon Borrell & Mara Tolosa, 2005. "Endogenous Antitrust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Impact of Competition-Enhancing Policies on Productivity," Industrial Organization, EconWPA 0504010, EconWPA.
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- O4 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
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