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Manipulability in a group activity selection problem

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  • Andreas Darmann

    (University of Graz)

Abstract

We consider the aspect of strategic manipulation in a group activity selection problem. Given a set of activities in which they might participate, the agents have preferences over the activities themselves and over the number of participants in the activities; the goal is to assign agents to activities on basis of their preferences. In this paper, we consider the possibility of strategic manipulation involved in providing solutions in such a setting, for the solution concepts of maximum individual rationality, core stability, and Pareto optimality respectively. For three different preference extensions (Gärdenfors extension, maxi–min extension and maxi–max extension) we analyze strategic manipulability with respect to the number of activities available. In general, the considered solution concepts turn out to be prone to strategic manipulation; in some natural special cases, however, strategyproofness is provided by such an aggregation.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Darmann, 2019. "Manipulability in a group activity selection problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 527-557, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:52:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-018-1155-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1155-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bhaskar Dutta & Anirban Kar & John A. Weymark, 2022. "Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 261-284, September.

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