Entscheidungskalküle jenseits des subjektiven Erwartungsnutzens

Summary Starting point are the well-known empirical violations of axioms of Bernoulli Rationality and the discussion about its prescriptive exclusivity. The paper classifies non-expected utility models into categories which are suitable to model different kinds of violations, depending on whether they follow either Allais or Ellsberg. The argument is brought forward that a modification of Hurwicz’s Criterion is a good compromise, provided that lower and upper probabilities exist: the model is axiomatically founded, practicable — that means simply applicable, clearly interpretable and compatible with expected utility — and allows the modelling of an important class of descriptive violations. The new aspects of the article are firstly a frame of reference for the use of the models depending on the type of violation. Secondly, an axiomatic bracing of the modified Hurwicz Criterion is given by characterizing it as a special case of the Choquet expected utility when lower and upper state-probabilities occur. Thirdly, for these probabilities a clear interpretation is given within the classic probability framework.