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Social ties and the political participation of firms

Author

Listed:
  • Cesi Cruz

    (University of British Columbia, Los Angeles)

  • Benjamin A. T. Graham

    (University of Southern California)

Abstract

It is widely accepted that better-connected firms exercise more political influence. However, because both social ties and political influence are difficult to observe, it remains little understood how different types of ties affect different types of political action. We develop new theory that contrasts the effects of ties to other firms in the same industry (peer ties) with ties to elected officials and bureaucrats (government ties). We argue that peer ties are useful for facilitating collective action, which is most often used to seek influence over broad policy issues that affect many firms. In contrast, while government ties are more versatile, these should primarily also allow firms to pursue narrow, particularistic issues that benefit only one or a small number of firms. Using a new survey of foreign-owned firms operating in the Philippines, we demonstrate that peer ties play an important role in firms’ efforts to influence policy at the national level, where issues are more likely to affect large numbers of firms. Government ties are also valuable, though primarily at the local level, where issues are more likely to affect a smaller number of firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Cesi Cruz & Benjamin A. T. Graham, 2022. "Social ties and the political participation of firms," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 117-142, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:17:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11558-021-09420-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-021-09420-6
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    Cited by:

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    2. Torsten Müller & Thorsten Schulten, 2022. "Die europäische Mindestlohn-Richtlinie – Paradigmenwechsel hin zu einem Sozialen Europa," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 48(3), pages 335-364.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Networks; Social ties; Social capital; Firms; Foreign investment; Foreign direct investment; FDI; Lobbying; Interest groups; Corporate political participation; Collective action;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • M16 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - International Business Administration

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