original papers : Altruism, redistribution and social insurance
AbstractThe paper examines the influence of altruism on voluntary transfers and government redistribution in a simple model: two jobs of different productivity are assigned by chance to two individuals. Ex ante the individuals are identical, ex post they have different incomes. The first part of the paper examines voluntary transfers determined ex post or agreed upon ex ante in the absence of altruism. In the second part, the influence of altruism is examined. Altruism is modelled as a pure public good: the minimum consumption (or income, since there is only one consumption good). Both individuals can contribute to its provision, one person by earning wage income, the other by voluntary transfers. The ex ante solutions generally lead to higher expected welfare but create several incentive problems. Only lump-sum transfers are considered.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 5 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 28 February 1997 / Accepted: 31 January 2000
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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