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Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 10 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 31-51
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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:1:p:31-51

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Related research

Keywords: Asymmetric first-price auction; D44; D82; C72; H57;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-42, February.
4. Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir, 2001. "First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 461-480. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • M. Landsberger & J. Rubinstein & E. Wolfstetter & S. Zamir, . "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-36, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
   • Michael Landsberger ; Jacob Rubinstein ; Elmar Wolfstetter ; Shmuel Zamir, . "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge," Working Papers 99-18, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-22.